Saturday, June 23, 2012

Former Fed Chief Greenspan Says Economy ‘Very Sluggish’


Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, said today the U.S. economy “looks very sluggish.”
Greenspan, in a television interview on Bloomberg Surveillance with Tom Keene, also said he sees “global slack” in the economy.
Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Photographer: Keith Bedford/Bloomberg
June 21 (Bloomberg) -- Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan speaks with Bloomberg's Tom Keene about the failure of sophisticated forecasts to catch the financial crisis. He speaks on Bloomberg Television's "Bloomberg Surveillance." (Source: Bloomberg)
The Fed yesterday extended its Operation Twist program, which will swap $267 billion in short-term securities with longer-term debt through the end of 2012. Fed officials also downgraded their forecasts for growth and employment while noting “significant downside risks” to the economy remain.
“It looks very sluggish to me,” Greenspan said when asked about the U.S. expansion. “We have a two-stage economy in this country.”
Referring to his recent writings, Greenspan said a little over 90 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product comes from producing assets with a life expectancy of less than 20 years. That part of the economy is “doing reasonably well.” He said the other approximately 8 percent, mainly the output of structures including single-family residences, is “down 50 percent.”
Greenspan, when he was asked about issues surrounding the $2 billion trading loss that JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon announced May 10, said that banks are supposed to take risks.

Banker Risks

“Bankers take risks” and “there are going to be failures” as a result, Greenspan said. “You want that type of culture whereby people take risks because unless they take risks you get very little in the way of innovation.”
“Creative destruction is what basically moves a market economy forward,” Greenspan said. “People may not like the destruction part but if you don’t have the destruction part eliminating the obsolescent capital you can’t have the growth.”
Greenspan, who led the U.S. central bank from 1987 to 2006, said he would favor maintaining large banks, if they don’t become “wards of the state.”
In Europe, Greenspan said one of the central issues is that rather than working toward solutions to close the fiscal deficit, world leaders are working on funding it.
“Until we shut off the deficits themselves, debt by definition continues to rise,” he said. “The general focus of policy” is “taking the easy way out with very long-term negative consequences.”
To contact the reporters on this story: Caroline Fairchild in New York atcfairchild2@bloomberg.net; Tom Keene in New York at tkeene@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Chris Wellisz at cwellisz@bloomberg.net

Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Jamie Dimon May Meet With Janitor About Pay


PHOTO: Jamie Dimon

JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon was in the hot seat again today, defending the country's biggest bank on Capitol Hill over risk-taking and trading losses then confronted later by a janitor about her pay.
Dimon testified before the House Financial Services Committee on Tuesday after the $2 billion and counting loss disclosed last month from JPMorgan's chief investment office. Lawmakers are worried that risky trading could lead to another taxpayer-funded bailout of the "too big to fail" banks, including JPMorgan.
The House committee is over twice the size of the Senate Banking committee, and peppered Dimon with questions last week, and asked more pointed questions to the chairman and CEO. And after the hearing, Dimon was confronted by a janitor employed in JPMorgan Chase tower in Houston.
Adriana Vasquez, 37, asked Dimon why the company, which has made billions in profits, is not paying workers who clean the company's buildings a "living wage."
Dimon told her to "call his office" to arrange a meeting.
Vasquez, who does not speak English but spoke through a translator provided by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), said she has been in the country for 16 years after leaving Costa Rica.
The SEIU said janitors in Houston like Vasquez make $9,000 a year and are hoping for a 50 cent raise. They have been offered a 10 cent raise over the next five years by the Houston Area Contractors Association.
About 3,200 janitors, whose contracts expired May 31, have said they would strike if they are not paid $10 an hour over the next three years.
Rep. Al Green, D-Texas, said he plans to meet with Dimon to discuss the issue.
"The average janitor in Houston is making less than the poverty level," Green said during the hearing. "I want to meet with you about something I call, 'too small to live off.'"
Jim Sinegal, director of financial services research at Morningstar, aninvestment firm, said he had expected a "less cordial" hearing than that of last week.
"I thought Dimon might have been more combative, but he seemed content to fall back on his talking points rather than escalate the debate," Sinegal said regarding JPMorgan's financial loss. "A few of the questioners clearly did their homework, although others didn't, and Dimon had some trouble with a few admittedly difficult questions."
Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., Rep. Maxine Waters, D-Calif., Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D-N.Y., Rep. Patrick McHenry, R-N.C., were among those who grilled Dimon about everything from jobs, Dimon's salary and, of course, Dodd-Frank Act's financial regulation.
"Parts of Dodd-Frank we supported, parts of Dodd-Frank we didn't support," Dimon said in response to a question by McHenry about whether he supported the legislation signed into law in July 2010.
"I remind people we do have the best capital markets in the world," Dimon said.
Jamie Dimon Apologizes in Senate Testimony Watch Video
JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon to Testify to Senate Watch Video
JP Morgan Loses $2 Billion on Risky Trades Watch Video
Sinegal said one interesting question was about the apparent discrepancy between JPMorgan's possession of excess deposits, which are invested by the company's chief investment office, and the number of small businesses that are still having trouble obtaining loans in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
"Like many banks, we have more deposits than loans – at quarter end, we held approximately $1.1 trillion in deposits and $700 billion in loans," Dimon said in his prepared testimony.
Frank asked Dimon for his thoughts about derivative trade exemptions to which Dimon explained that JPMorgan's trades were cleared. The long-standing representative from Massachusetts also asked Dimon about a proposal to cut funds from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). He answered that he has "never looked at the CFTC budget" and could not answer the question.
Frank said he was "disappointed" by Dimon's responses.
In answer to another question from Frank, Dimon said he did not know if he would be the subject of potential clawbacks by the board of directors which determines his compensation.
"I can't tell my board what to do," Dimon told Frank.
Rep. Maloney, who represents the district in which Dimon resides, accused JPMorgan of "sending" jobs to London to which he responded that the company follows its customers and the time difference provided some benefit in operating there.
Maloney seemed to momentarily stump Dimon when she asked him about the timing of the company's disclosure on May 10 of its losses.
Dimon paused and conferred with his general counsel who sat behind him. Dimon eventually said he did not understand the extent of the losses until later in April.
"We disclosed what we knew when we knew it," Dimon said during the hearing.
The company will disclose the size of the loss on July 13 when it releases its second quarter results.
The chairwoman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Mary Shapiro, said last month there could be sanctions against JPMorgan if it violated disclosure rules about the risk measurement known as value-at-risk, or VaR, which measures how much a firm could lose on securities.
Dimon's illustrious career in finance began after the Harvard Business School to American Express, Citigroup, and Banc One, where he became CEO in 2000. In 2004, when Banc One was purchased by JPMorgan, he became president of the combined company, then later CEO. On his watch, JPMorgan has grown to be the biggest U.S. bank in terms of market capitalization and assets under management.
"Wall Street for the most part are honest, hardworking, decent people," Dimon told the committee, and is "trusted" by clients.
"All firms are different," Dimon said. "I can't speak for every firm while I'm standing here."
Dimon stressed that he was against the notion of "too big to fail," that the government will bail out large institutions with taxpayer money. He later told the committee JPMorgan's goal is "not to be the biggest but the best."
Before the question and answer session, Dimon's four-page prepared remarks for Tuesday were nearly identical to those of last week before the Senate committee.
"We will lose some of our shareholders' money - and for that, we feel terrible - but no client, customer or taxpayer money was impacted by this incident," he said in his prepared remarks both last week and on Tuesday.
Dimon told the committee it would be more effective to discuss financial rule-making behind closed doors, not during a hearing, and "not pretend they're either for Volcker or against Volcker."
Regulation is not "binary" but "complicated," he stressed several times.
Before Dimon appeared before the committee, the heads of various regulatory agencies testified, including the chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission, CFTC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the general counsel of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Last week, Dimon told the Senate Banking Committee that the trades that led to billions in losses were placed by traders who didn't understand the risks they were taking, which could not have been prevented regulation.
Dimon has been repeatedly asked by lawmakers to comment about whether the Dodd-Frank Act's Volcker Rule, which prohibits certain proprietary trading and has yet to be finalized, could have stopped the debacle.
When pressed by Sen. David Vitter, R-La., about the Volcker Rule, Dimon called the regulation, as it is described thus far, as "vague" and "unnecessary." Instead, Dimon said what are needed from financial firms are factors such as, proper capital, liquidity, risk measures and risk controls.
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"Jamie Dimon, you're no good. The people need a Robin Hood"


JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon was greeted in Congress Tuesday, by nurses and healthcare activists chanting, "Jamie Dimon, you're no good. The people need a Robin Hood."
 
Tuesday June 19th, saw the formal launch of an NNU-led national campaign for the Robin Hood Tax. Not just in DC, but all over the country, nurses and their allies showed up at branches and offices of JP Morgan Chase summoning the spirit of the 13th century British bandit.
As National Nurses United President Rose Ann deMoro explains:  "It's time to pay up for the damage you have done to our communities and our nation."
It's an idea whose time has long since come, they say, and there's no better time to be talking about it than this moment. The Robin Hood tax, or financial transaction tax (also known as the Tobin tax after the US economist who first proposed a version of it,) would impose a levy on financial transactions, like sales of stocks, bonds and derivatives. It would take from the rich and generate revenues for poor public services, and stymie reckless speculation -- like the gamble that lost JP Morgan that missing $2 billion --  in the process.
Globally, the tax has won fans from South Africa's Archbishop Desmond Tutu to Pope Benedict. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said Monday that the European Union will "soon" move forward with a financial transaction tax. "We want the financial transaction tax to become a reality in Europe, and if possible at global level," Barroso said before the start of the G20 summit in Mexico.
Internationally, the Robin Hood tax, or FTT is largely seen as a possible way to generate development funds for impoverished nations. In the US, NNU and their allies see the tax as a way to inject needed funds into public services that are already way past breaking point.  The NNU cites estimates that the tax could generate as much as $350 billion for public coffers from the Americans most well able to pay: the financial sector. So far, every time there's been rumor that President Obama's team might be about to propose such a thing, the Treasury's been quick to deny it. At the G20, the United States has up to now managed to stymied progress on the topic. Like Britain's Conservatives (led by PM David Cameron,) they argue that taxing the financial sector might be "counterproductive."   For whom, one might ask.
DeMoro argues:  "Compensation pools at the seven biggest US banks totaled $156 billion in 2011, a 3.7% increase over the previous year's record-breaking number. It is only fair that financial transactions incur a sales tax – just as the rest of us pay – and put some Wall Street resources back into Main Street."
While a bill introduced last year by Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.) would impose a 0.03 percent fee -- or 3 cents on the dollar; the NNU want 50 cents. Why is tax policy a nurses' issue? A year ago, at the NNU national convention, I talked to RNs who cried as they described the swollen caseloads they are forced to face on shrunken budgets in hospitals that are generating healthy profits for private corporations.
"No matter how the US supreme court rules in the coming days on the 2010 Affordable Care Act, employers will continue to drop health coverage or shift more costs to workers; medical bills will continue to account for nearly two-thirds of bankruptcies, and insurance companies will still deny needed care," writes deMoro. "The healthcare crisis has been severely aggravated by the economic collapse. Nurses see the signs in dire human terms, every day."
For more on the Campaign for a Robin Hood Tax which has support from small farmers, religious leaders, AIDS activists, and Tom Morello, as well as the NNU -- see http://www.robinhoodtax.org/.

Forget Jamie Dimon -- Congress needs to look in the mirror

By John Berlau, Luca Gattoni-Celli
Published June 19, 2012
FoxNews.com

Reuters
“Jamie Dimon gets kid-glove treatment from Senators,” the front-page headline in Politico screamed after the JPMorgan Chase CEO testified and was questioned by the Senate Banking Committee late last week.
Fast forward to this week. Politico's Kate Nocera and other Beltway scolds are warning the House Financial Services Committee not to give Dimon such “kid glove” treatment when he testifies in the other chamber Tuesday.
But the real story from last week's testimony was not the lack of scrutiny for Dimon. There were plenty of tough, but still polite, questions for him. What really made the pro-big government elites foam at the mouth was that, for once, government spending and regulation did not get the kid gloves.
Thanks to questions from South Carolina Republican Sen. Jim DeMint, and others, who shifted the subject to big-picture topics and flawed government policies such as the Dodd-Frank financial “reform,” the hearing is actually a model for Tuesday's event and for future economic hearings.
DeMint ignited the wrath of the liberal punditocracy by daring to compare the recently reported $2 billion trading loss at Dimon’s otherwise profitable firm to the billions – or trillions – that Congress squanders all the time.
He opened his questioning by remarking to Dimon, “We can hardly sit in judgment of you losing $2 billion; we lose twice that [amount] here in Washington every day and plan to continue to do so.”
DeMint’s speaking truth to the real power – the power of big government – earned him even more than the usual scorn he gets from powerful members of the media establishment.
Soon after, DeMint was questioned by no less a political philosopher that Jon Stewart on "The Daily Show" in one of his preachy  tirades, “Does Senator DeMint think that spending money is the same as losing money?”
Similarly, an Atlantic Wire blogger tut-tutted that DeMint was “apparently equating government spending with bank loses [sic].”
Have Stewart and company never heard of the Bridge to Nowhere, General Services Administration travel expenses, or the entire Department of Education?  Most Americans wouldn’t think “losing money” is too strong a description for some of billion-dollar boondoggles.
And then there are the regulatory “losses” that impose costs that discourage new jobs and new business, and also sometimes reduce bank safety and soundness. The $1 billion dollar expenditure unearthed at the hearing but overlooked by most of the media was Dimon’s statement to Sen. Mike Johanns (R-Neb.) that Dodd-Frank costs JPMC alone $1 billion a year.
Wouldn’t at least a portion of that billion be better used in the form of more loans or even shoring up bank reserves than complying with the paperwork of the law’s more than 2,500 pages?
How does the law’s transfer of around $8 billion a year from banks and consumers to wealthy retailers – through Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin’s amendment putting price controls on the interchange fees merchants pay to process debit cards – contribute to preventing the next financial crisis?
But in Washington, of course, there’s a billion dollars and then there’s a billion dollars. In only one instance, according to the Beltway elites, are we supposed to care how a couple billion dollars is lost.
Just as the dominant media nags and scolds minimize government waste and the costs of regulations such as Dodd-Frank on the private sector, they frequently magnify losses in the private sector. During his questioning of Dimon, DeMint set the facts on this straight as well.
“It’s comforting to know that even with a $2 billion loss in a trade last year, your company still had a $19 billion profit,” DeMint pointed out. He was citing the net profit of Dimon’s firm for 2011.
American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter Wallison, who served on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission created by Congress, made a similar point in the Daily Caller: “Banking is a very risky business; only news reporters could think otherwise. A $2 billion loss sounds like a lot, but it’s 1/1000th the size of JPMC’s balance sheet.”
Dimon acknowledged that changes in risk modeling and a lack of managerial oversight along with simple human error made the loss bigger than he initially expected. But the trades were part of an otherwise successful hedging strategy necessary to counter the ordinary risks of banking.
As Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn) pointed out during the hearing, “The biggest risk a bank takes is making loans,” and these loans couldn’t be made without hedging. As Wallison noted, hedging is exempt from Dodd-Frank’s “Volcker Rule” restricting banks from proprietary trading, and if the final rule from regulatory agencies were to ban such hedging, it would do much more harm than good.
But there is no such thing as a perfect hedge that always helps a firm turn a profit. That JPMC lost money is a sign that market discipline still holds some relevance in the post-meltdown, bailout-era financial system. We have a profit and loss system, as Milton Friedman always emphasized when politicians would panic about a certain firm’s troubles.
Should a single private firm’s loss even be the subject of a Congressional hearing?  Banking Committee Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) pondered that question in his opening statement, but concluded that when taxpayer money and financial stability are at risk, Congress has a responsibility to investigate
Shelby is correct, but the hearing’s purpose should not be simply to bash the leaders of that particular firm, but for Congress to also look itself in the mirror. In accomplishing this, albeit unintentionally, thanks to lawmakers like DeMint who broke from the media’s script, the Senate hearing on JPMC was successful.
The House should follow its lead when Dimon testifies there today.
John Berlau is Senior Fellow for Finance and Access to Capital at the Competitive Enterprise Institute. Luca Gattoni-Celli is a Research Associate at CEI.


Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/06/19/forget-jamie-dimon-congress-needs-to-look-in-mirror/#ixzz1yI9qGFy2

Representative Himes on Questions for Jamie Dimon

Loopholes Abound Despite New Rules


Jamie Dimon at a Senate banking hearing last week.Larry Downing/ReutersJamie Dimon at a Senate bankinghearing last week.
Bank regulators are casting new nets to catch excessive risk-taking in the financial system. But future London Whales may find plenty of ways to slip right through them.
The story of JPMorgan Chase’s multibillion-dollar trading loss is now well known. Traders, including Bruno Iksil, nicknamed the London Whale, amassed large positions in credit derivatives as part of a complex trading strategythat eventually soured.
The motivations for the trades were unclear. While the bank says they were intended to offset other risks on the books, the strategy also appeared to have a speculative element.

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Nearly four years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers incited a worldwide financial crisis, such blowups are all too probable.
Banks in the United States are still operating in a sort of regulatory no-man’s land. Many of the new post-crisis rules have not yet become effective. And even when they do, the loopholes remain large.
The Volcker Rule, part of the Dodd-Frank legislation that will be phased in over the next two years, is intended to catch certain types of trading. But it may not snag the wagers of JPMorgan’s Whale.
While this regulation prevents banks from doing speculative trades with their own money, it will not stop hedging activities, which JPMorgan has said were at the root of the trading losses. The Volcker Rule contains guidelines that are meant to help regulators decide whether a hedge masks a proprietary bet. But even with these prescriptions, speculative trading could still slip through.
In JPMorgan’s case, the bank wanted to hedge the large amount of loans and bonds on its balance sheet. To do that, its hedging strategy initially centered on buying bearish derivatives that would rise in value as the creditworthiness of large companies deteriorated. Then, in January, JPMorgan started putting on a huge bullish credit position, to help temper the bearish bet — essentially, a hedge on a hedge.
To help distinguish between hedges and speculation, the rule asks the banks to be able to show that the hedges have a relationship with the assets being hedged. However, it requires only that they be “reasonably correlated.” The rule says that hedges are allowed if they are “made in connection with, and related to, individual or aggregated positions.” JPMorgan could point to that and argue that the Whale’s trades were related to the bank’s corporate loans and bonds.
Other parts of Dodd-Frank try to temper risk in more subtle ways. The regulatory overhaul tries to move many derivatives onto central clearinghouses, entities that handle the underlying payments on a trade. This is supposed to strengthen the derivatives markets, because the clearinghouses will force participants to back their trades with margin payments made in cash or very safe securities. In theory, the financial burden of supplying margin to clearinghouses could make Whale-type trades prohibitively expensive, and therefore less attractive for banks.
But the main type of derivative in the Whale’s loss-making trade — a credit index called the CDX.NA.IG.9 — is already centrally cleared in large amounts, according to figures from ICE Clear, a clearinghouse that handles that index. If JPMorgan’s positions are executed through a clearinghouse, it would mean that the added costs of clearing did not prove a deterrent, and might not stop similar traders in the future.
However, one part of this net may work. Some derivatives analysts think JPMorgan may be exposed to “tranches” of the CDX.NA.IG.9 index. Tranches slice up credit indexes in such a way that participants can choose to take on more or less credit risk. Tranches of the CDX.NA.IG.9 are not executed through a clearinghouse.
That is a crucial issue, because regulators are planning to demand much higher margin payments on derivatives that are not centrally cleared. If regulators do set this margin above clearinghouse levels, such trades may become too expensive for banks.
But some analysts think the extra margin may not be a sufficient deterrent. “If it is a trade you really believe in, you may still go ahead and do it, even if it is more expensive,” said Olu Sonola, an analyst at Fitch Ratings.
Another effective measure may stem from the new international banking regulations set by the Basel committee. On paper, they will force banks to hold a lot more capital against certain trading positions, even ones using centrally-cleared derivatives.
The new Basel rules’ impact on JPMorgan’s credit bets could prove substantial, which the bank’s chief executive, Jamie Dimon, indicated last week in his Congressional testimony. In the fourth quarter of last year, he said, the latest Basel rules stood to increase the “risk-weighted” value of the credit derivatives portfolio that contains the Whale’s trades to $60 billion, from $20 billion.
Under Basel, a bank sets capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. Consequently, a tripling of the position’s risk-weighted size would lead to a tripling of capital held against it. Notably, proposed Basel trading rules could force banks to hold more capital if regulators see evidence that hedges may not perform effectively in stressed situations, said Jerome McCluskey, a lawyer at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.
But again it seems there may be an out. In his testimony, Mr. Dimon implied that JPMorgan thought the large bullish bets would actually make its credit derivatives portfolio less onerous under new Basel rules. It’s possible that JPMorgan misread the Basel rules, or miscalculated the risks of the trade when setting its risk-weighted value. Even if both are true, it remains that the bank thought tens of billions of dollars in new trades — trades that ultimately blew up — would sail straight through Basel net.
All that means the Whale is far from extinct on Wall Street.

Jamie Dimon Disagrees With Us ’Wild Socialists’


Today's Bloomberg View editorial on taxpayer subsidies for large banks, including JPMorgan Chase & Co.,  came up at this morning's House Financial Services Committee hearing with JPMorgan Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon. Representative Brad Sherman, a CaliforniaDemocrat, asked Dimon if his bank qualifies as "too big to fail," as the subsidy seems to indicate, citing the editorial.
Dimon said he disagreed with the conclusion that his bank gets a subsidy in the form of lower borrowing costs. He also argued that his bank's bigness was beneficial in the financial meltdown. Here's the exchange:
SHERMAN: Now, I'd like to, without objection, put in the record an editorial by the wild socialists over at Bloomberg. They point to a study just published by the IMF that says that your bank enjoys a $14 billion subsidy, that its cost of funds is some 0.8 percent lower because of the implicit federal guarantee. What we saw in 2008 is a belief around the world that if a bank your size was going to go under there would be a bailout, not just of insured depositors, but of all creditors. And that belief, which reduces your costs by 0.8 percent of your total funds, is responsible for $14 billion.
You are in a position where you are simply too big to fail. You lost $2 billion or some multiple of that. You happen to be very well financed. But you bet over $300 billion. You're lucky and fortunate and wise that you didn't lose more. Can you say on behalf of all the banks with over $100 billion in assets that all of them could have survived a mistake this size? The question is, why should we allow you to be so big that if you go under we are going to have to bail out your creditors?
DIMON: So banks should take risks relative to their size and capability. So you can't compare all the banks. And I would venture -- and I'm not going to change what you believe -- but a lot of banks were a port in the storm. I know it's convenient to blame them all for everything. But JPMorgan's size and capability and diversification in '08, '09 and 2010 allowed us to continue to do the things that you wanted us to do. We never stopped making loans. We bought Bear Stearns at the request of the United States government. We helped the FDIC fund by buying [Washington Mutual]. We lent money to California, New Jersey. It allowed us to do it. So we try to be a conservative company that does the right thing. Every now and then we make mistakes.
SHERMAN: And how can medium size banks compete against you when your cost of capital is reduced by 80 basis points, 0.8 percent, because of a belief that if they go under we'll let 'em go under, but if you go under we'll bail out your creditors?
DIMON: And I don't believe that's true. I'm going to give you two facts, if you don't mind. Fact number one is, we borrow in the marketplace, unsecured, with the smartest people in the world. It costs us 200 basis points over Treasury. It costs the average single A industrial like 100 basis points over Treasury. So if everyone's so smart and knew that we're too big to fail, we'd be trading at 10 basis points over Treasury.
SHERMAN: Well, after you lost all that money in London, I would expect that creditors would be reluctant to loan to you.
DIMON: Most of that $350 billion predominantly is in the United States, it's not in London. Most of it's here. The second is the FDIC report, which looks at average funding costs, because we have studied this report a way back, and almost all of it, if I remember correctly, was related to mix. We're a money center bank. We have a tremendous sum of money which we keep very short term and overnight, which costs us very little right now, because of the way the yield curve is. But we're the checking account for large corporations, including some nations, and so we invest that money very short and make almost no money on it. It shows up as a low funding cost, but our actual cost of funds for retail deposits, middle market deposits and negotiated deposits is probably pretty much like everybody else.
SHERMAN: There isn't a small- or medium-size banker who agrees with you.
(Paula Dwyer is a member of the Bloomberg View editorial board. Follow her on Twitter.)